A constitutional personality: does the New Zealand public service possess one, and is it in good order? by Eichbaum, Chris
Page 50 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 12, Issue 3 – August 2016
Chris Eichbaum
Chris Eichbaum is the Associate Dean (Learning and Teaching) in the Victoria Business School and 
Reader in Government at Victoria University of Wellington.
A Constitutional 
Personality 
does the New Zealand  
public service possess one, 
and is it in good order?
Constitution, noun: a body of fundamental principles 
or established precedents according to which a state or 
other organisation is acknowledged to be governed.
Acknowledged, adjective: accepted as valid or legitimate.
Constitutional, adjective: relating to an established set of 
principles governing a state.
Personality, noun: the combination of characteristics or 
qualities that form an individual’s distinctive character.
the end of the term of the incumbent 
on 4 July 2016. The editorial praised 
the appointment and Hughes, and was 
somewhat critical of the incumbent, Iain 
Rennie. Others can judge.
In the second paragraph the editorial 
notes that:
The commissioner’s job is very 
tough. They must uphold the 
independence of the civil service 
while remaining the loyal servant of 
the government. This is a difficult 
balancing act and not all Hughes’ 
predecessors have managed it.
The real import of the editorial is 
to be found in its title, which is quite 
provocative. A more tempered (and some 
would no doubt say constitutionally 
accurate) title might have read: ‘Servants 
of the people and the government’. But 
editorials are about making a point, 
and this one does. Having rehearsed the 
The first part
On 4 May 2016 the Dominion Post 
published an editorial, as it is wont to 
do on matters it deems of sufficient 
importance. This editorial was entitled 
‘Servants of the people, not govt’. For the 
purposes of this article it is tempting to 
reproduce the editorial in its entirety. 
Typically such pieces are written with an 
efficiency of expression that generates 
maximum impact. Such was the case 
here. The point of departure was an 
announcement by the government of 
the appointment of Peter Hughes as the 
next state services commissioner, with 
his appointment to take effect following 
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putative strengths of the appointee and 
the limitations of his predecessor, it goes 
on to state:
The Key Government has shown a 
certain disdain for the civil service. 
Its set of goals for the bureaucracy is 
pitched high, as it should be.
This is not a Government that 
encourages its advisers to proffer 
unwelcome advice. In that it is not 
alone, of course, but sometimes 
officials should be brave and tell 
the minister something he or she 
doesn’t want to hear. Hughes’ job as 
commissioner is to show some spine 
and to back top officials who do 
likewise.
The Government has also 
shown a cynical attitude towards its 
responsibilities under the Official 
Information Act, with ministers 
regularly taking the maximum 
amount of time allowable to respond 
to requests. This is to flout the 
spirit of the law. Here, too, Hughes’ 
approach will be watched with 
interest.
Good judgement is essential in 
government, although most voters 
would laugh at anyone who suggested 
it. People are rightly cynical about 
politics; in the struggle for power, 
however, the greatest political virtue 
is wisdom – and it’s also the rarest.
The role of the sage adviser might 
seem outmoded. It’s not.
The editorial goes on to note, 
approvingly, the appointment of Principal 
Youth Court Judge Andrew Becroft as the 
children’s commissioner.
When we deconstruct the editorial 
it contains both positive and normative 
elements. Both can be discerned from the 
following summary: 
•	 The	public	service	has	a	duty	of	
service to the people of Aotearoa/
New Zealand. That duty takes 
the form of some measure of 
independence.
•	 The	public	service	has	a	duty	of	
loyalty to the government of the 
day, including to seek to realise the 
objectives or results set for it by that 
government.
•	 The	duty	is	codified,	in	part	by	
statute.
•	 The	duty	is	not	being	discharged	as	it	
should be.
•	 The	state	services	commissioner	
needs to ensure that the civil service 
is able to meet the duties and 
responsibilities it carries.
At the risk of doing considerable 
violence to what I would describe as an 
extremely well-crafted editorial, let me 
distil it down to a single statement: the 
New Zealand public service enjoys a 
constitutional personality (or identity) 
and as such it is vital to the integrity, 
efficiency and effectiveness of our system 
of government and governance that the 
personality is recognised, respected and 
protected. It is this that forms the thesis, 
provocation or disruption that this article 
advances. The objective – as perhaps 
also of the writer(s) who produced the 
Dominion Post editorial – is to encourage 
a conversation.1 
The second part: of constitutions and the 
public service
What then of the constitution of 
Aotearoa/New Zealand and what it says 
about the public service? As often stated, 
New Zealand is a member of a small club 
of three (the other two being the United 
Kingdom and Israel) whose constitutions 
are not codified into a single document, 
typically a ‘higher’ law. It is incorrect to 
say that the New Zealand constitution is 
largely uncodified. It is correct to say that 
the codification takes many forms, and 
the law is but one.
That leads us to a second characteristic 
of New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements, although this is a common 
feature of a number of nations: that 
the constitution combines law and 
convention. One of the ‘go to’ readings 
for the constitutional innocents one 
encounters in university classes (and it is 
noteworthy that these ‘innocents’ are not 
confined to undergraduate classes) is the 
impressive essay which acts as an extended 
introduction to the New Zealand Cabinet 
Manual – itself one of the more important 
elements of New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements.2 That introduction, entitled 
‘On the constitution of New Zealand: 
an introduction to the foundations of 
the current form of government’, is by 
Sir Kenneth Keith. It notes the many 
sources of the constitution, including the 
conventions. It is perhaps for legal scholars 
to debate, but one might assert that the 
Cabinet Manual itself is, by way of its 
content and its status, a convention of the 
constitution. It is not a legal document, 
and on that basis not enforceable before 
a court. And as Sir Kenneth notes: 
Constitutional conventions are of 
critical importance to the working of 
the constitution, even though they 
are not enforceable by the courts. In 
1982, the Supreme Court of Canada 
summarised the constitutional 
position in that country in an 
equation: constitutional conventions 
plus constitutional law equal the total 
constitution of the country. (Cabinet 
Office, 2008, p.2) 
This is, of course, an interesting 
formula for the purposes of engaging 
others in discussion about the nature 
of the constitutional arrangements of 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. An invitation 
to consider whether the formula ‘works’ 
for New Zealand provides a useful segue 
into considering the status of the Treaty 
of Waitangi. That is outside of the scope 
of the present discussion, but, solely 
for the record, adding the treaty to the 
... New Zealand is a member of a small 
club of three ... whose constitutions are 
not codified into a single document, 
typically a ‘higher’ law.
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formula does, in my view, provide a more 
complete picture.
Sir Kenneth does note the public 
service in his introductory essay, 
thereby indicating that it is part of the 
constitutional fabric. Moreover, he notes 
that a number of statutes set out in 
some detail the role of the public service, 
including the State Sector Act 1988, the 
Public Finance Act 1989 and the Official 
Information Act 1982. He goes on to 
observe that:
Constitutional principles and that 
legislation support four broad 
propositions (among others). 
Members of the public service:
•	 are	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	
law;
•	 are	to	be	imbued	with	the	spirit	
of service to the community;
•	 are	(as	appropriate)	to	give	free	
and frank advice to Ministers 
and others in authority, and, 
when decisions have been 
taken, to give effect to those 
decisions in accordance with their 
responsibility to the Ministers or 
others;
•	 when	legislation	so	provides,	
are to act independently in 
accordance with that legislation.
Public servants meet those obligations 
in accordance with important 
principles such as neutrality and 
independence, and as members of a 
career service. (ibid., pp.4-5)
The tenor is consistent with the 
normative thrust of the editorial reviewed 
earlier. What is clear is that there is 
acceptance that such matters do form part 
of the constitutional fabric, and that they 
are manifest in both law and convention. 
The third part
At an informal seminar in which I 
first attempted to present these issues 
to colleagues and seek comment and 
guidance, one colleague posed the 
question: ‘Have you read and reflected on 
Scott’s The New Zealand Constitution? … 
you may find it is useful given the kinds 
of issues you have an interest in.’ I replied 
that I had not but that I would, and I did. 
It was excellent advice. 
It is the case that constitutions that 
are porous, flexible, iterative, not fully 
codified in law and almost exclusively 
not entrenched are likely to evolve 
over time. Indeed, that is one of the 
arguments advanced in support of the 
kind of constitutional arrangements we 
are endowed with. And so we do find 
constitutional change, and some of it of 
a very significant kind: the Electoral Act 
1993 is an exemplary case in point. One 
might add parenthetically that there is 
also at times some disquiet as to how ‘low’ 
the threshold is – in terms of procedural 
requirements – to change or modify those 
constitutional arrangements. Indeed, 
the Cabinet Manual is, one might argue, 
the province of the executive branch 
of government, and – presumably by 
convention – is ratified by an incoming 
government at the first meeting of the 
Cabinet. It is in no way to question 
the integrity of the document – it is a 
document of substance and its status 
appears to be acknowledged and respected 
by political and administrative actors 
across the board – to note that it can be, 
and indeed has been, modified without 
reference to the legislative branch of the 
state.3
But to return to Scott. Scott 
characterised his work in his preface 
as an ‘essay in constitutional analysis’. 
The author died on 19 July 1961, and a 
publisher’s note indicates that he was 
not able to manage the final stages of 
proofing.4 I suspect that Scott might well 
also have added some additional prefatory 
comments. One dives into the issues 
as one would into a cold bathing pool. 
There is no introductory chapter. Chapter 
1, entitled ‘The Constitution’, provides an 
overview of the Constitution Act 1852 
– an act repealed by the Constitution 
Act 1986, which may, in the fullness of 
time, be itself subject to further repeal. 
Certainly, the principal architect of the 
1986 legislation makes no secret of his 
desire to prosecute a change of this kind. 
Scott’s ‘essay’ consists of seven 
chapters. What is interesting is that 
institutions and not broad branches or 
functions provide the chapter titles. And 
so chapter 2 is ‘Parliament’, not ‘The 
Legislative Branch’ or something similar. 
The head of state – as an institution – 
is granted a chapter in its own right. 
Chapter 4 is on ‘Cabinet’. Chapter 5 is on 
‘The Public Service’, and it is this chapter 
that I want to comment on here. The 
fact that the public service features in an 
essay on the constitution of New Zealand 
is in itself a significant statement. It is 
not my intention to traverse all of the 
issues that Scott addresses in this chapter. 
What can be said, however, is that the 
provenance of these issues is to be found 
in the settlement that produced the 1912 
Public Service Act. And what should 
also be emphasised is that, in very large 
part, it is that settlement that continues 
to underpin the constitutional role of 
the public service in New Zealand. So, 
notwithstanding the organic nature of 
New Zealand constitutional arrangements, 
there is, at least in respect of the nature 
of the public service and attendant 
constitutional rights and responsibilities, 
an unbroken thread that has been in 
place for over a century. There is on that 
basis nothing improper in following that 
thread back to 1962 and dwelling on 
Scott’s reflections at that time. 
Scott observes that 
The central constitutional facts 
about government employment 
in New Zealand are the absence 
of political patronage and the 
correlative neutrality of the public 
It is the case that constitutions that 
are porous, flexible, iterative, not fully 
codified in law and almost exclusively 
not entrenched are likely to evolve over 
time.
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service. Appointment depends 
on qualifications, and promotion 
depends on merit and seniority. 
(Scott, 1962, p.137, emphasis added)
A perennial tension is between a duty 
of service to the government of the day 
and a duty of care to the public interest. 
It is worth quoting Scott at some length:
Public servants owe a duty of 
loyalty to their minister and to the 
government generally … Statements 
of the content of the duty of loyalty 
are seldom precise, but those that 
are precise are often contradictory. 
The extreme views are: (1) that 
the duty of loyalty is subject to the 
exception that public servants should 
protect the public interest from the 
marauding activities of politicians; 
and (2) that public servants 
should do all they can to help the 
government to win the next election. 
(p.140)
For his part, Scott is highly dismissive 
of the first and much more accepting 
of the second. Where the public interest 
lies is a matter of opinion. What matters 
more is that it is ministers who are 
responsible:
The case for giving political power 
to ministers in a parliamentary 
democracy is not that they can 
always be guaranteed to know 
with a mechanical perfection 
where the public interest lies, 
but that they are responsible; 
so our constitutional system is 
not subverted by the errors of 
judgement that ministers, being 
human, are bound to make, but 
is subverted by the obstruction of 
ministerial wishes by politically 
irresponsible public servants. 
(ibid.)
For Scott, the protections against 
overt politicisation in policymaking (and 
he uses the example – more important 
under a first-past-the-post electoral 
system, but still material – of advantaging 
‘marginal electorates’) are to be found in 
the capacity of an opposition to expose 
it. However, there is something noble, 
but one might argue considerably naïve, 
in Scott’s assertion that:
If a government neglects long-term 
considerations, and is returned 
at the next general election (as is 
usual in New Zealand), it will suffer 
during the next parliamentary term. 
Whether it is re-elected or not, it will 
be criticised for taking a short-term 
view … For a public servant who 
feels that the government is taking 
any kind of partisan attitude instead 
of promoting the national interest, 
the best tactic is to co-operate loyally 
in the administration of government 
policy, and leave the electors to 
punish the government. (p.141)
One is tempted to reflect on both how 
much times have changed and how much 
they have not.
Scott then turns to ‘advice on policy’. 
Here, one might argue, there is less 
naïvety and a greater measure of acuity:
A permanent head’s duty is to 
see that his minister receives the 
best information and advice his 
department can offer. To say no 
more would be to leave the matter 
nebulous, for value-free social science 
is a chimera, and so is a social 
technology that could infer the line 
of policy development from the logic 
of the situation. (ibid.)
But Scott then takes the argument 
into undisputedly constitutional terrain 
by posing the question ‘whether the 
permanent head should take account 
of the anticipated reactions of citizens’ 
(p.142). He then proceeds further into 
what he characterises as even more 
difficult territory in examining the tension 
between the imperatives of partisan 
considerations and robust policy advice, 
and on these matters he is unequivocal:
Where a permanent head thinks 
the minister is wrong about the 
merits of a policy, or wrong in 
allowing himself to be influenced by 
considerations of political principle 
or of political interest, he owes it to 
the minister to say so. He owes the 
duty of offering disinterested and 
fearless advice, and should argue as 
strongly as he feels is justified. (ibid.)
And so, in a somewhat different 
institutional context – but arguably one 
that is constitutionally little changed – we 
have a strong articulation of the doctrine, 
or perhaps more correctly convention, of 
free, frank and fearless advice. 
And what of independence? For 
Scott this is clearly problematic, and he 
cites a case where advice provided by a 
government department to a tribunal 
(the Price Tribunal) was at variance with 
the stated policies of the government of 
the day. 
The doctrine of responsible 
government appears to have been 
overlooked in a recent instance where 
comment was made that certain 
submissions were the views of the 
Department concerned and not 
necessarily the views of the Minister 
in charge. Constitutionally, such 
comment is fallacious and tends to 
undermine the convention that the 
public servant is anonymous and only 
the Minister has identity. (p.147)
For the purposes of this article, the 
word personality might be substituted 
for identity. There may well be a constant 
and unbroken thread that starts with the 
Public Service Act 1912, but on the matter 
For Scott the protections against overt 
politicisation in policymaking ... are to 
be found in the capacity of an opposition 
to expose it.
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of ‘independence’ there is continuity in 
some respects, and a marked discontinuity 
in others.5 
The fourth part: a duty to whom?
A leading Canadian legal scholar, Lorne 
Sossin, has written extensively on the 
constitutional status of the public service 
(see, for example, Sossin, 2005). That 
body of work is relevant to the present 
discussion, and will be the subject of further 
examination. But we have narrowed our 
theme down to independence, or more 
correctly constitutional independence, 
and Sossin’s work speaks directly to this.
Sossin argues that in the Canadian 
context: 
the civil service is subject to a dense 
network of constitutional provisions, 
conventions, and principles and that 
our democratic institutions and 
practices would be meaningfully 
enhanced if these rules, principles, 
and conventions were more fully 
elaborated. Civil servants are 
the guardians of a public trust 
underlying the exercise of all public 
authority. Their ability to maintain 
the integrity of that trust and, 
when called upon, to ‘speak truth 
to power’ depends on a measure of 
independence from undue political 
influence. Neutrality, integrity, 
professionalism, and trust, on this 
view, are inextricably linked to the 
norm of bureaucratic independence. 
(Sossin, 2005, p.1)
This leads Sossin to pose a number of 
questions:
To what extent, and in what 
circumstances, does public 
servants’ duty to the Crown to 
uphold the public interest permit, 
or even require, them to refuse 
instructions from the government 
of the day? What constitutional 
doctrines enable bureaucrats to 
remain protected from the undue 
interference of their ministers? 
What safeguards ensure that civil 
servants cannot use their positions 
to partisan ends? Is bureaucratic 
independence, to the extent it 
is safeguarded, consistent with 
democratic principles? Could it 
be used to frustrate the legitimate 
goals of democratically elected 
governments that rely on the civil 
service to implement their policies? 
(ibid., p.3)
These are all questions worthy of 
serious consideration.
To anticipate the conclusion 
Sossin arrives at: it is not to vest in 
the public service as an institution a 
distinctive constitutional personality, 
but instead to confer on those with 
particular responsibilities within the 
public service (most notably the public 
servant ‘whosoever by reason of their 
discretionary or decision-making 
authority has a duty to discharge a public 
trust through conduct or action that 
political interference might undermine’ 
(ibid., p.19)) certain constitutional 
obligations. Suffice to say I disagree, but 
that is for another time.
The other important question 
Sossin poses in more general terms is, 
if independence is to be sought for the 
public service, then independence from 
whom? Public servants discharge their 
responsibility to the Crown, but is that 
synonymous with the government of 
the day? And what of ‘the state’: is that 
synonymous with the Crown?
The fifth part
In February 1985 the head of the British 
civil service, Sir Robert Armstrong, 
issued what is known as the Armstrong 
Memorandum. Paragraph three reads as 
follows:
Civil Servants are servants of the 
Crown. For all practical purposes the 
Crown in this context means and is 
represented by the Government of 
the day. There are special cases in 
which certain functions are conferred 
in law upon particular members 
of or groups of members of the 
public service, but in general the 
executive powers of the Crown are 
exercised by and on advice of Her 
Majesty’s Ministers, who are in turn 
answerable to Parliament. The Civil 
Service as such has no constitutional 
personality or responsibility 
separate from the duly Constituted 
Government of the day ... . (quoted 
in Maer, 2015, emphasis added)6 
The Armstrong Memorandum was a 
direct result of the acquittal of a senior 
British Ministry of Defence official, Clive 
Ponting, who was prosecuted under the 
Official Secrets Act. Ponting had found 
evidence that directly contradicted 
the official government account of the 
decision to sink the Argentinian cruiser 
the General Belgrano in the course of 
the Falklands war. When his ministerial 
superiors declined to act on his advice, and 
continued with the official justification 
that the Argentinian vessel constituted 
a threat to the British naval taskforce as 
it was heading towards the taskforce and 
was within an ‘exclusion zone’ (both of 
which were untrue), Ponting provided 
his analysis to a parliamentary select 
committee. After an 11-day trial the jury 
reached a not guilty verdict over a lunch 
break.7
Ponting’s summary of his own defence 
is illuminating in that he argued that he 
acted on what he saw as an obligation or 
duty to the interests of the British state – 
perhaps the Crown – and that these were 
not prescribed by and identical to the 
Constitutional reviews ... have resulted 
in recommendations identifying 
weaknesses in the present constitutional 
arrangements relating to the role and 
functions of the public service.
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interests of the government of the day. 
Outside the court following the decision 
Ponting declared: 
I did what I thought was right in 
leaking the documents ... a civil 
servant is not, in the final analysis, at 
the beck and call of ministers only. 
We also serve the wider national 
interest (quoted in Dalyell, 2003).8
The sixth and concluding part
The Dominion Post editorial would have 
it that all is not as well as it might be 
in the state of Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
Perhaps the appointment of a new 
state services commissioner will assist; 
that remains to be seen. However, the 
argument advanced here is that the 
malady identified in that editorial is 
bigger than one person. The matters are 
fundamentally constitutional, and if the 
present constitutional arrangements 
– whether in the form of statute or 
convention – are not fit for purpose, then 
perhaps a constitutional remedy needs 
to be found. Constitutional reviews, 
including the most recent (Constitutional 
Advisory Panel, 2013), have resulted in 
recommendations identifying weaknesses 
in the present constitutional arrangements 
relating to the role and functions of the 
public service. It is regrettable, not least 
because of the considerable investment 
honourable people have made in such 
reviews, that there has to date, in terms 
of a response from government, been a 
grateful silence and inaction. But there are 
constitutional architects among us, and 
there are portents of things to come. Let 
us hope that the public service features in 
any emergent constitutional architecture.
1 We who have chosen – albeit for a time – to locate ourselves 
in universities cannot but look on with envy at the impact 
editorial writers are able to achieve, and hope that one day 
the metric used to measure the ‘impact’ of what it is that we 
do in universities will share more than it currently does with 
measurements of the reach of the print and other media.
2 The Cabinet Manual also contains a foreword, written by 
former prime minister Helen Clark, and a preface by former 
secretary of the Cabinet Diane Morcom.
3 A former secretary to the Cabinet, and at the time the deputy 
secretary, addressed this issue in a paper presented in 2006: 
‘The executive is entitled to amend its own working rules, 
and it is entitled to official support in doing so. The Cabinet 
Office officials responsible for working with the Manual are 
responsible to the Prime Minister and the Governor-General 
for its content, for applying its guidance to particular fact 
situations, and for policy related to the Manual. We are, of 
course, also subject to the usual public service accountability 
mechanisms, including the Official Information Act, select 
committee appearances and media scrutiny’ (Kitteridge, 
2006). That said, it is the case that an important component 
of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements can be 
modified by the executive alone, and it is a legitimate 
question whether this should, in effect, form part of the 
prerogative powers of that body.
4 It might be argued that, in the light of the earlier observation 
that the constitution of Aotearoa/New Zealand is an organic 
work in progress, seeking insight from a work published 
in 1962 is questionable. There is some merit to that. The 
world has changed significantly since then and so has New 
Zealand, in myriad ways, including in its constitutional 
arrangements. And there is in some respects a dated 
quality, in the language, but also in comments on political 
culture (itself not an irrelevant consideration in matters 
constitutional). The following extract is a case in point. 
Posing the question of whether a change of government may 
present difficulties when ministers are required to work with 
senior officials who have enjoyed a long-standing relationship 
with the ‘other side’, Scott comments that this is unlikely: 
‘Part of the explanation is that changes of government are 
relatively infrequent in New Zealand; but a more important 
part of the explanation is the remarkable continuity of policy 
from one government to another’ (p.143). The first part of 
that observation is perhaps as relevant now as it was in 
1962, but some might question whether the same can be 
said of the latter part.
5 For example, the independence afforded the Reserve Bank 
pursuant to the Reserve Bank Act 1989 enables and may 
even encourage that institution to operate at variance with 
the preferences of the government of the day, and more 
specifically the responsible minister. While in an ideal 
situation monetary and fiscal policy will operate in a mutually 
reinforcing manner, informed by a shared assessment of the 
environment and agreement on forecasts, that has not always 
been the case. Moreover, while the practice has not been 
adopted by recent governors, there have been cases where 
the governor of the bank has interpreted the institutional 
independence afforded to the bank as a personal licence to 
comment on a wide range of policies, not always directly 
related to the bank’s mandate. Similarly, the Public Finance 
Act provides a measure of independence to the secretary 
of the New Zealand Treasury when it comes to matters of 
economic and fiscal transparency. Section 26W(2)b of that 
act provides that economic and fiscal updates must include 
‘a statement by the Secretary that the Treasury has supplied 
to the Minister, and to any other Minister designated for the 
purpose of this paragraph, an economic and fiscal update’ 
and that this must incorporate ‘the fiscal and economic 
implications of the decisions and circumstances’ referred 
to in the statement. The detail here is far less important 
in the current context than the general principle, and it 
is a principle that I would assert is a constitutional one: 
specifically, that there are circumstances in which the public 
service is required to operate independently of ministers in 
furnishing advice that is public in nature. 
6 Maer notes that the Armstrong Memorandum was 
eventually incorporated into a civil service management 
code. ‘The Treasury and Civil Service Committee report in 
November 1994 summarised contemporary thinking on the 
status of the Armstrong Memorandum and argued for its 
replacement: It recommended the establishment of a civil 
service code of ethics (para. 103–107) and an independent 
appeals procedure based on a strengthened Civil Service 
Commissioner body (para. 108–112). It also called for a 
Civil Service Act to provide statutory backing to maintain the 
essential values of the Civil Service (para. 116). It included 
a draft Code at Annex 1 of its report, upon which it invited 
detailed comments from the Government. The Government 
response published in The Civil Service: taking forward 
continuity and change accepted the proposal for a new 
Civil Service Code, and provided a revised version of the 
Committee’s draft as an Annex’ (Maer, 2015, p.6). 
7 For a detailed and insightful analysis of this matter and the 
issues raised regarding the ethical obligations of civil servants 
see Uhr, 2005, pp.164-81.
8 And it is from this case that we draw the Ponting principle: 
‘Loyalty to one’s superiors is only provisional, loyalty to the 
public interest and to the democratic process are the ultimate 
obligations of functionaries’ (Uhr, 2005, p.167).
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